

NRAs coordination on REMIT investigations ACER's perspective

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Outline

• The mandate

The tools


The example

The challenges



The mandate: ACER shall aim to ensure coordination and consistency

`The Agency shall aim to ensure that NRAs carry out their tasks under this Regulation in a coordinated and consistent way.' – Article 16 (1) of REMIT





The tools: Eight main tools with different reaches and impacts

Two wide range tools:

- ACER Guidance
 - ✓ ACER Guidance
 - ✓ Guidance Notes
- Coordination meetings on REMIT case investigations
 - ✓ ACER/NRAs
 - √ 1:Many REMIT Coordination Group (4/year)
 - √ 1:Many Market Monitoring
 Standing Committee (5/year)
 - ✓ ACER/ESMA/Financial regulators
 - √ 1:Many Energy Trading
 Enforcement Forum (1/year)





The tools: Eight main tools with different reaches and impacts

Six targeted tools (four in use):

- Case updates
 - √ 1:1 ACER/NRA meetings on cases
 - Case related workshops
 - ✓ Follow-ups on notifications
- Cross notifications
- Request NRAs any information related to the suspected breach
- Request NRAs to commence an investigation of the suspected breach
- Establishment and coordination of investigatory groups

Support NRAs on REMIT investigations

chronical
lack of HR to
implement
REMIT these
two tools are
not used
currently by
ACER as they
are HR

intensive

Due to the





The type of behaviour

✓ Acquisition of all or part of the available transmission capacity without using it or without using it effectively

The context

- ✓ Continuous electricity intraday markets
- ✓ Transmission capacity is priced implicitly at zero

The problem

- harms the use of cross-border interconnectors to deliver economically efficient outcomes
- reduces the scope for competition in one or more connected wholesale energy markets
- ✓ prevents energy prices from converging



The start

- ✓ First reports of the behaviour by Energy Exchanges (PPATs) 2015
- ✓ Further events identified by NRAs 2015

The current status

✓ Two Decisions imposing sanctions were issued





- ✓ ACER implemented two alerts that cover the behaviour in its market surveillance system
- ✓ Several alerts shared with NRAs on the behaviour ever since




• What did you see?

- ✓ The referral of the two cases for enforcement by the Danish Utility Regulator (DUR) to the Public Prosecutor coincided with ACER's issuance of the Guidance Note on the behaviour of transmission capacity hoarding
- ✓ DUR and ACER coordinated the press releases once the Decisions were taken Published the same day with coordinated text

But, ... there is significant work behind the scenes from the NRA and ACER side to make it happen ...



• How did we get there?






The challenge: ACER's limited mandate coupled with lack of resources

A fragile ecosystem to ensure consistency:

- ACER A mandate of means ('aim') with insufficient resources
- NRAs New area, limited staff, and increasing number of cases
- New provision on support on investigations by ACER but no additional resources allocated





Thank you for your attention!



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